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Highlights
 – Market actors are calling for a post-2020 energy technology policy framework now. 
As a result, the policy is likely to be negotiated in a time of fierce global competi-
tion in clean-tech markets, financial crisis and institutional frictions in the EU. To 
contribute to the debate and to assist DG ENER to prepare a new Communication 
on ‘Energy Technologies in a future European Energy Policy’, our THINK report 
discusses a renewed EU energy technology policy towards 2050. 
 – A first possible policy path would be to extend the 2020 policies to 2030 and 2050. 
From this reference case, departures in two major ways are possible. Policy path 
2 would rely on a strong carbon price signal and technology-neutral support to 
innovation. In contrast, an alternative policy path 3 would depart from a weak 
carbon price signal and technology targets. 
 – A multi-criteria evaluation shows that no single policy path is clearly superior to 
another. Therefore, a renewed SET Plan should allow for all possible future policy 
paths. Priority technologies that are key to achieve 2050 objectives and/or can help 
to support green growth within the EU should be identified based on a comprehen-
sive approach across sectors. 
 – But not only the policy context is uncertain. There are also other possible futures 
not yet recognized in the EU Energy Roadmap 2050. First, shifts in paradigm of EU 
energy policy away from decarbonization and in favor of competitiveness or supply 
security might call for strong technology support. Second, technological revolu-
tions, such as a global shale gas revolution, could result in the “rational” price of 
carbon falling extremely low.
 – There are several reasons that justify some directed technology push, instead of 
building fully on technology-neutral support to innovation. Pushing energy ef-
ficiency enhancing and enabling technologies thereby offers a no-regret strategy 
in any future setting and dominates other push strategies in terms of implementa-
bility and robustness. Creating options for technology breakthroughs has to be a 
main pillar in any future SET-Plan.
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Background
There are huge challenges for policy makers if the EU climate 
policy goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 
80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 is to be reached. Moreover, 
the current period of austerity has imposed tight constraints on 
national budgets and has forced governments to rethink fiscal 
policies. Some Member States have recently abandoned several 
expensive energy policies, mostly those promoting clean energy 
technologies. In light of these changes, there is no doubt that a 
new and more stable energy technology policy design for the 
post-2020 period is needed. It is, however, not clear how ex-
actly this new policy should address limitations of the current 
2020 framework while, at the same time, taking into account 
the fierce global competition in markets for clean technologies. 
Market actors are calling for a new technology policy frame-
work now, and so the policy will likely be negotiated in a time of 
financial crisis and institutional frictions in the EU. 
There is certainly a need for public support. Policy intervention 
is required to correct market failures originating from environ-
mental and innovation externalities, to account for capital mar-
ket imperfections and to fully exploit international trade op-
portunities in clean technologies. Policy intervention, therefore, 
can be motivated by both market failures and strategic industry 
and trade policy issues. There further is a need for EU involve-
ment to coordinate market failure corrections between Member 
States and to combine national forces. 
The role of the SET Plan will depend on the context of 
carbon pricing 
To capture the broad spectrum of policy options, we introduce 
three possible future pathways for an EU energy technology 
policy. Departing from a reference case, i.e., the improvement 
and extension of 2020 policies to the 2050 horizon, we identify 
two other possible directions for future policy. Policy path 2 
departs from a strong carbon price signal and will mainly involve 
technology-neutral support to innovation. In this path, after 
having delivered its initial push, the SET Plan as an instrument 
to prioritize among technologies and projects ceases by 2020. 
From that point, it would rather function in a ‘light’ version as a 
platform for open access information exchange and stakeholder 
coordination and cooperation. In this form, the SET Plan would 
preliminary become a tool that supports innovators’ and inves-
tors’ decision making and that could help to attract private 
funds. In contrast, an alternative policy path 3 departs from a 
weak carbon price signal and technology targets. Directed tech-
nology push prioritizing certain technologies would play a ma-
jor role to enforce these targets. In this path, an ‘advanced’ SET 
Plan would also be a tool to determine an optimal portfolio of 
low-carbon technologies and research activities across sectors 
and would then also provide the basis for target setting and an 
optimal allocation of public (and especially European) funds. 
Today it can be doubted that, based on the current scheme and 
the currently determined emission cap, carbon prices in the 
magnitude of those reported in different EU Energy Roadmap 
scenarios and those needed in policy path 2 can be implement-
ed.2 Nonetheless, design improvements have the potential to 
make the EU ETS a stronger policy instrument: The future ETS 
design should aim to include the highest possible base under 
the scheme and broaden the impact of the common carbon 
price, while also aligning non-ETS carbon prices. 
No policy path is clearly superior to another. A multi-criteria 
evaluation of these policies (see Table 1) shows that, whereas 
price signals are in theory the most cost-efficient way to achieve 
climate goals, in practice the signaling effect of carbon prices 
might not be strong enough. Policymakers face considerable 
2. Carbon prices in the underlying simulation exercises (between 234 €/t and 
310 €/t) are determined such that 2050 targets are reached, assuming equal 
prices/values for ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
Figure 1: Role of the SET Plan in different possible future policy paths
Source: Own depiction 
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difficulties in implementing ‘high-enough’ prices and in includ-
ing all GHG emissions into the scheme. Technology targets and 
directed push, on the other hand, have a relatively larger po-
tential to enhance green growth and to give (even if biased in 
magnitude) strong signals to investors. Moreover, technology 
targets could account for different national technology push 
programs and could adjust the burden of decarbonization be-
tween Member States. In times of economic and institutional 
crises, these burden sharing and cooperation mechanisms in-
crease the robustness and implementability of technology sup-
port. However, Member States are typically reluctant to give too 
much power to the EU and defining sectoral targets will also 
cause problems related to the subsidiarity issue.
Implications for a renewed post-2020 SET 
Plan
A renewed post-2020 SET Plan should allow for all possible fu-
ture policy paths. It should not exclude the possibility of acting 
within a certain future context and, hence, should be more fo-
cused than the current SET Plan and provide the basis for plan-
ning and prioritization among decarbonization technologies. 
In a first step and similar to the current model, stakeholders 
from individual sectors could work together within Industrial 
Initiatives to identify technological progress and future research 
needs. In a second step, priority technologies that (a) are key to 
achieve 2050 objectives, and/or (b) can help to support green 
growth within the Union should be identified based on a com-
prehensive approach across sectors. 
Such targets have to be determined by carefully analyzing the 
growth potentials of European manufacturers and the degree of 
competition they face from foreign clean technology produc-
ers. Selected technology targets and EU funding of innovation 
should then be in line with the SET Plan prioritization. Key 
performance indicators, similar to those already specified in to-
day’s sectoral Technology Roadmaps, shall be used as a tool for 
monitoring and reviewing the progress of technology develop-
ment, demonstration and deployment and should become an 
essential element and contributing factor for funding decisions. 
Not only carbon pricing is uncertain
But not only carbon pricing is uncertain. The EU Energy Road-
map scenarios are designed around a menu of technologies that 
are essentially well-known. However, 2050 is 37 years from now. 
40 years ago, there had not been oil crises, European energy 
Table 1: Summary of the evaluation of policy paths
Criterion Evaluation 
Climate-effectiveness Assumption that decarbonization objective can be reached under all policies. 
Green growth Path 3 is best able to enhance green growth due to the strong role of directed technology push and 
the possibility to explicitly support domestic European firms.
In contrast, path 1 has a lower ability to enhance green growth and path 2 has growth potentials only 
in the longer-run, due to the high carbon price, that, however, also attracts non-EU made abatement 
products.
Robustness to EU 
financial crises and 
institutional difficulties
Path 3 is the most robust option with sectoral targets providing stable investment signals. The ability 
to account for different national technology push programs and to adjust the burden of decarboniza-
tion among Member States is only given in this policy path.
In contrast, path 1 does not present adequate remedies, yet. Path 2 is not robust to financial crises or 
institutional frictions, too, due to the lack of the ability to account for Member State heterogeneity.
Cost-efficiency Path 2 is the most cost-efficient solution. Abatement costs across all sectors and abatement channels 
are minimized when implementing one common emission price. 
In contrast, paths 1 and 3 suffer from weak carbon price signals.
Implementability Path 1 is most easy to implement, as implementation efforts are low and subsidiarity compatibility 
is given.
In contrast, path 2 is not fully feasible as the implementation of a scheme with one unique and high 
enough carbon price covering all GHG emissions would pose sever political difficulties. For path 3, 
implementation barriers mainly relate to achieving an agreement on sectoral targets and the related 
burden sharing among Member States. 
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markets had national structures and electricity generation from 
RES was close to zero. The optimal portfolio of decarboniza-
tion technologies has a very long time horizon, not only looking 
ahead to the 2050 target, but technological lock-ins will persist 
even beyond. It is not only this very long-term nature of the 
problem – also recent developments such as the Fukushima ac-
cident influenced possible future scenarios. Another example 
is the increasing interest in US unconventional gas resources. 
Whereas the International Energy Agency in its World Energy 
Outlook 2007 (when the 20-20-20 strategy was adopted by the 
European Council) did not mention shale gas at all, the World 
Energy Outlook 2011 is talking about a possible “golden age of 
gas”. 
Hence, there are not only substantial uncertainties regarding vi-
able decarbonization technologies within the context of the EU 
Energy Roadmap, but there are also possible futures that are not 
yet recognized in 2050 roadmaps and these raise the need for 
technology push policies. First, it is not guaranteed that – given 
the triangle of energy policy goals with decarbonization, secu-
rity of supply and competitiveness – long-run energy policy will 
maintain its decarbonization focus. Shifts in paradigm of EU en-
ergy policy away from decarbonization and in favor of competi-
tiveness might weaken carbon pricing mechanisms, calling for 
an even stronger technology support. Similarly, a shift in favor 
of supply security requires a stronger push for decarbonization 
technologies in order to achieve balanced energy portfolios, as 
well as a strong push for enabling technologies such as networks 
to guarantee energy systems which function properly. Second, 
technological revolutions, such as a possible global shale gas 
revolution, could result in the “rational” price of carbon falling 
extremely low. 
Implications for European technology push
There are several reasons that justify some directed technology 
push, rather than relying fully on technology-neutral support 
for innovation. First, certain low-carbon technologies are key to 
achieving the transition to a low-carbon economy and there are 
reasonable concerns that without such support they will not be 
developed and deployed on the necessary scale and/or on time3. 
Second, European technology push can have its justification as 
a means to respond to fierce global competition in green-tech 
markets and to help to keep wealth within the EU. The burden 
to finance market pull measures is always with consumers and 
tax payers but benefits can be reaped by both domestic innova-
tors and producers, but also market entrants from outside the 
EU. In contrast, directed technology push can be designed such 
3. This could for instance be the case for CCS. All scenarios of the EU Energy 
Roadmap contain a substantial part of electricity generation using this 
technology (between 10% in the ‘high RES’ and 33% in the ‘Reference’ case in 
2050) with CCS being viable from 2030 on.
that it favors domestic European players. By explicitly target-
ing specific technologies, it would also allow policy makers to 
accelerate technology development and to support industrial 
leadership. This strategy is promising, especially for high-tech 
segments or parts of the value chain that cannot be outsourced 
to low-cost competitors.
Pushing energy efficiency enhancing technologies dominates 
other push strategies in terms of both feasibility and robustness. 
Without detailed cost- and technological data, it is not possible 
to give disaggregated technology-specific recommendations as 
to what technologies and research activities to push. However, 
from our analysis we can draw a general conclusion. The pri-
oritization of low-carbon production technologies entails high 
risks of picking wrong winners. In contrast, pushing energy ef-
ficiency enhancing technologies is politically feasible: Opposing 
to a push for production technologies that often would benefit 
certain Member States in which major suppliers are located, 
energy efficiency enhancing technologies benefit all industries 
independent of geographic location and create jobs across all 
Member States. Such push also is robust with respect to future 
energy market developments: Consuming less is a no-regret 
policy and minimizes system interdependences of a directed 
push. 
For similar reasons, pushing enabling technologies (such as 
grids, advanced metering or market facilitation via ICT equip-
ment) is a no-regret strategy. As for the technology group 
discussed above, investments are typically quite domestically 
labor-intensive. However, for grid infrastructures – as for ena-
bling technologies in general – the appropriate magnitude of 
investment will depend on the amount and type of renewable 
energy that enters the power system. The optimal system archi-
tecture will also depend on whether we move towards ‘Europe-
an-wide energy superhighways’ with massive solar energy be-
ing imported from North Africa and huge amounts of offshore 
wind energy being produced in the North Sea, or whether we 
move instead towards a system of rising local energy autonomy, 
featured also by widespread demand side management. 
The creation of options for technology breakthroughs has to be 
a main pillar in any future SET Plan. While strategies for tech-
nologies close to the market rely on shorter-run benefits like 
green growth stimuli up to 2020 or 2030, such push strategies 
have to be accompanied by long-run funding commitments for 
a wide range of immature technologies that might successfully 
be deployable after 2030 and towards 2050. As the stage of inno-
vation involves basic research and very early R&D (i.e. projects 
that entail a low chance of success but a sufficiently high pay-
off if successful), the argument for broad technology funding 
becomes important. Over time, and as the probability of suc-
cess increases, funds should become more concentrated. Such 
funding of potential technology breakthroughs will not lead to 
5Policy Brief 2013/01
Florence School of Regulation
lock-in effects or stranded investments once a modified SET 
Plan mandates new technology priorities, but would instead be 
disconnected from future policy paths.
It is then equally important to bring concepts that have been 
successfully developed in the laboratory to the manufactur-
ing phase and to commercial deployment. European support 
for (incremental) innovation can help to bridge the “valley of 
death” and to bring to the market first prototypes of new tech-
nologies. 
Member States are not homogenous with regards to their tech-
nology base and ability to finance. Political considerations, 
such as who are the beneficiaries of support, will impact on 
the planning and priority setting for technologies when draft-
ing the SET Plan and the agreements on where funding comes 
from. On the one hand, there are countries that benefit from 
relatively low financing cost, available public money and a high 
consumer willingness to pay for energy policy. On the other, 
there are countries with rather limited private and public will-
ingness and ability to pay for low-carbon innovation, such as 
countries currently suffering from the debt crisis. In addition, 
low-carbon technology bases range from strong low-carbon in-
dustry positions for e.g. wind energy in Germany or Denmark, 
to countries that do not have any of these or similar technol-
ogy advantages yet. These differences hamper agreements for a 
unified approach for technology support. Therefore, designing 
an energy technology policy top-down is difficult to sustain, 
which highlights the need for decentralized solutions co-exist-
ing with European funding and support schemes. 
The future energy technology policy also has to present a re-
liable and credible framework to investors and innovators, 
and also to consumers, who ultimately pay for these policies. 
In this vein, we present “no-regret measures” other than the 
above being also valid for any future policy (see Box 1). In con-
trast, there might be certain “regret measures” related to in-
dustry and trade policy. Current trade disputes related to clean 
technologies illustrate the complexity of such policies. There 
is a fine line between supporting technologies and subsidizing 
industries. Any industrial or trade policy which favors Euro-
pean players must be debated and designed with care and the 
grounds for introducing such measures should only relate to 
environmental or innovation externalities.
Box 1: Additional “no-regret” measures for any future EU energy technology policy
#1 – Enable an attractive and stable business environment: The stability of support policies, in the sense of predictability and 
transparency, is considered by far the most important factor for investors. Additionally, stakeholders complain about complex 
and lengthy permit granting procedures as a major barrier to investment and which increases project risk, which, particularly 
in countries with stressed capital markets, results in rising cost of capital. Recent policy initiatives are promising. Horizon 2020 
aims to improve administrative procedures and also the implementation of an EU patenting system in 2014 will substantially 
decrease costs for innovators. 
#2 – Engage consumers and citizens: Even where measures to reduce emissions on the consumer side are cost-efficient, various 
barriers still prevent action (lack of information, high transaction costs especially for small decentralized projects, regulated 
end consumer prices, etc.). These barriers need to be addressed by e.g. implementing regulatory measures such as minimum 
efficiency standards for appliances and buildings. Information policies can reduce ignorance and information asymmetries and 
also can encourage behavioral changes. Energy Service Companies can help to overcome constraints in paying possibly high 
upfront cost and can substantially reduce clients’ search and information efforts. 
#3 – Spend the available public money wisely: Experts agree that 2050 is technologically feasible, but that a key challenge 
will be the mobilization of the required capital. Subsidies are by far the preferred policy instruments to fund clean energy in-
novation of any type. However, this instrument should only be used as an instrument of last resort. The form of direct public 
support, considering also e.g. low-interest loans, loan guarantees, public equity and technology prizes, needs to be tailored 
to the features of each innovation project and to the type of entity best placed to undertake the respective RD&D. Moreover, 
spending public money wisely also involves a smart design of financing instruments. Furthermore, new funding sources should 
be considered. Existing fossil fuel subsidies need to be revised and policy makers could take into account a wider use of auction 
revenues from the EU ETS to fund innovation. 
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